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versus Nanosecond pulses
Blind for review
Abstract—Laser fault injection into SRAM cells is a widely used
technique to perform fault attacks. In previous works, Roscian
and Sarafianos studied the relations between the layout of the cell,
its different laser-sensitive areas and their associated fault model
using 50 ns duration laser pulses. In this paper, we report similar
experiments carried out using shorter laser pulses (30 ps duration
instead of 50 ns). Laser-sensitive areas that did not appear at
50 ns were observed. Additionally, these experiments confirmed
the validity of the bit-set/bit-reset fault model over the bit-flip
one. We also propose an upgrade of the simulation model they
used to take into account laser pulses in the picosecond range.
Finally, we performed additional laser fault injection experiments
on the RAM memory of a microcontroller to validate the previous
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault attacks are a subset of the wide array of physical
attacks existing against secure circuits. Their goal is to disturb
a circuit and then to exploit the resulting computation errors.
Perturbations can be induced by different means: optical
attacks [1], voltage [2] and clock glitches [3], electromagnetic
pulses, etc.
Methods such as Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) [4]–[7]
use the differences between the faulted and correct outputs
of encryption algorithms to recover the encryption keys. The
success and efficiency of the DFA is highly dependent on the
fault model [8], as such, knowing that a specific fault model
is relevant and usable for a given target is important. Faults
injected into memory cells are usually modeled using either
the bit-set/bit-reset or the bit-flip fault model. A bit-set is the
case where the cell state is changed from “0” towards “1” but
unchanged if the cell state is already “0”, while a bit-reset is
the case where the cell state is changed from “1” towards “0”
but unchanged if the cell state is already “1”. In the case of a
bit-flip, the cell state is inverted (i.e. flipped) regardless of its
initial state.
In previous works, Sarafianos et al. [9] and Roscian et
al. [10] both studied the fault models that apply to SRAM
cells for laser-induced faults. They drew maps of the laser-
sensitive areas of a 5 transistors SRAM cell using a 50 ns
laser pulse duration. It showed that one of the theoretical
sensitive areas was hidden and did not allow to inject faults.
They also came to the conclusion that the bit-set/bit-reset fault
model is the relevant one as they did not obtain any bit-flip
type fault. They also validated their results through simulation
using the electrical model of transistors exposed to laser
stimulation described in [9], [11], [12]. Finally, they obtained
further validation of their results by performing fault injection
experiments on the RAM memory of a microcontroller.
Having a robust simulation model to anticipate the behavior
of a chip when submitted to fault injection attempts may
permit to reveal a security weakness before actual production
(hence saving the cost and time of a redesign).
In this paper, we report similar experiments carried out with
30 ps laser pulses. It revealed a laser-sensitive area which was
masked at 50 ns laser pulse duration. We also confirmed the
relevance of the bit-set/bit-reset fault model. These results are
backed by experimental results obtained on a dedicated SRAM
prototype and on the RAM memory of a microcontroller. We
then improved the simulation model to fit with our new results.
Note that a nanosecond range pulse duration is common for
hardware security testing, whereas a picosecond range duration
is mandatory for emulating radiation effects caused by ionizing
particles [13].
This article is organized as follows: First, we remind the
mechanisms of laser fault injection, going from a PN-junction
to a SRAM cell. Second, we review the results of previous
works. Third, we present our experimental results and work in
designing a simulation model. Finally, we draw a conclusion.
II. LASER FAULT INJECTION MECHANISM
A. Physical Phenomenon
Laser fault injection is achieved using the photoelectric
effect [14]. When a laser beam passes through silicon, if the
photon energy is greater than the band-gap of the silicon,
electron-hole pairs are created. In most cases, the pairs then
just recombine and nothing happens. However, when the laser
beam is targeted at a PN-junction, electrons and holes are
drifted in opposite directions by the PN-junction electrical
field, thus creating a transient current across the junction.
The phenomenon happens in three phases highlighted in
figure 1:
1) Charges are created along the path of the beam,
2) Charges are drifted away by the PN-junction electric
field, stretching the depletion region along the laser
beam path. The charges nearby are then promptly col-
lected, creating a current spike,
3) The remaining charges are then slowly collected in a
diffusion phase: the current magnitude decreases slowly
until all charges have been collected or have recombined.
B. Effect on an Inverter
Despite creating a transient current, laser illumination of
a PN-junction may not be sufficient to alter the logic state
Fig. 1: Laser-induced photocurrent generation in PN-junctions
[10] [15].
of a target. Using an inverter as an example, there are 4 PN-
junctions with an electrical field capable of creating a transient
current, both drains and sources of the two transistors.
In the case where the input state of the inverter is “0”, the
PMOS transistor is “ON” and the NMOS transistor is “OFF”
resulting in a “1” logic state output (as depicted in the left
part of figure 2). A laser pulse targeting the NMOS’ drain will
have an effect on the output of the inverter. In this situation,
the transient current goes from the drain towards the substrate,
discharging the load capacitance. As a result, the output state
of the inverter temporarily changes to a low-level until the
transient current ends. Then, the load capacitance is re-charged
through the “ON” PMOS transistor and the output state of the
inverter goes back to a high state. This transient output voltage
can propagate itself further in the logic. It is called a Single
Event Transient (SET) [15].
Targeting the inverter’s other PN-junctions would not create
any SET. Indeed, transient currents created in the PMOS’ drain
or source would create leakage paths towards the N-Well
which is biased at Vdd and therefore would not discharge the
load capacitance. Any transient current induced in the NMOS
source would also have no effect since it is isolated from the
output by the “OFF” NMOS.
A similar reasoning may be done in the case where the
input is in a “1” state (right part of figure 2), only a transient
current created in the “OFF” PMOS’ drain would create a SET
and alter the inverter’s output. The laser-sensitive areas for
each state of the inverter are highlighted in red in figure 2.
They match the drain of the ”OFF” transistor.
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Fig. 2: Laser-sensitive areas (red) of an inverter depending on
its state.
C. Effect on a SRAM Cell and Fault Model
The core part of a SRAM cell is made of two cross-coupled
inverters (figure 3a). If a SET is induced in one of the two
inverters (figure 3b), it propagates through the second one
(figure 3c), driving the cell in its opposite steady state. When
the transient current vanishes, since the cell is in a steady state
it doesn’t revert to its previous state and the stored value is
altered (figure 3d). This phenomenon is called a Single Event
Upset (SEU) [15].
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Fig. 3: Single Event Upset mechanism.
As a result of the inverter analysis, we can assume that
for each state of a SRAM cell (“0” or “1”) the drains of
the OFF transistors of the two core inverters can produce an
SEU when targeted. This means that a SRAM cell should have
4 SEU-sensitive areas linked to its inverters (there are also
laser-sensitive areas linked to the access transistors). Figure 4
displays the laser-sensitive areas of the 5 transistors SRAM cell
we used during our experiments. In this instance, we define
a bit-set (resp. bit-reset) as the switching of the cell’s output
node (Data_out) from “0” to “1” (resp. from “1” to “0”) as a
result of a laser shot.
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Fig. 4: Schematic of the 5T SRAM cell with its sensitive areas.
D. SRAM Cell Layout and Sensitive Areas
The cell, which measures 4µm by 9µm, is embedded in
a 0.25µm CMOS technology chip. The chip was specifically
designed for laser testing, with as few metal layers as possible
above the cell to allow front side laser fault injection (metal
paths reflect laser light, hence shielding a device against laser
exposure). Figure 5a shows the layout of the cell along with
the positions of its different laser-sensitive areas. Consider the
drain of transistor MP1 (upper left part of figure 5a). It is laser-
sensitive only if the SRAM is in its “0” state: targeting it with
a laser may induce a bit-set. In figure 5a, laser sensitive areas
causing bit-sets are highlighted in red. Those corresponding
to bit-resets are highlighted in blue. If the bit-set and bit-reset
areas do not overlap (due to laser settings that limits its effect
area) it should be impossible to inject bit-flip faults.
However, if the effect area of a laser shot is sufficiently
large, the bit-set/reset areas may extend and overlap as exem-
plified in figure 5b. A laser beam targeted at an overlap area
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Fig. 5: 5T SRAM cell layout.
(a bit-flip area) may be able to induce a SEU regardless of the
SRAM’s state: this corresponds to the bit-flip fault model.
III. PREVIOUS WORKS FOR 50 NS PULSE DURATION
During their experiments Roscian et al. [10] used a 1064 nm
laser source, a 1µm spot size, and a pulse duration of 50 ns.
Their target was a 5 transistors SRAM cell designed in CMOS
0.25µm technology (see figure 4).
The first point that came out from their experiments is that
only three of the four expected sensitive areas created SEUs.
The drain of MP2 did not react as expected: the sensitive area
was masked. In [9] Sarafianos et al. made the hypothesis that
this phenomenon was due to the comparatively small surface
of the drain of MP2 compared to a counter-balancing effect
of the photocurrent induced in the shared drain of transistors
MN2 and MN3, MN3 is the access transistor of the SRAM
(see figure 5a). Note that MP2’s drain has a drain surface
smaller than that of MN2/MN3 which makes this phenomenon
happen (the photocurrent magnitude is proportional to the
drain surface). Figure 6 from [10] reports the obtained laser-
sensitivity map of the SRAM cell at 0.42W laser power.
Fig. 6: 5T SRAM laser-sensitivity map for 50 ns pulses [10].
The second point in these results was that no bit-flip type
faults were obtained. Contrary to their previous hypothesis, no
laser position allowed to create both a bit-set and a bit-reset
faults.
A. Simulation Results
Using the electrical model introduced by Sarafianos et al.
in [9], [11], [12], they were able to validate their results on
simulation basis: the obtained map of laser-sensitive areas is
given in figure 7 for a laser pulse duration of 50 ns. This
laser-sensitivity map matches the experimental results (see
figure 6): no bit-flip faults were obtained (there is no overlap
between bit-set and bit-reset areas, given in red and blue
respectively), the fourth laser-sensitive area of transistor MP2
is also missing. The electrical models they built was tuned
for laser pulses ranging from 50 ns to 20µs. It allowed the
authors of [9] and [10] to explain the counterbalancing effect
that leads to the masking of the MP2 drain sensitive area and
also to explain the infeasibility of bit-flip type faults.
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Fig. 7: Simulation-based laser-sensitive map of a 5T SRAM at
50 ns laser pulse duration.
B. Application to a Commercial Microcontroller
[10] reports similar experiments conducted on the RAM
of a 0.35µm CMOS technology commercial microcontroller
using the same laser settings. The results are shown in figure
8 (the size of one SRAM cell is highlighted with a black
square). Similarly, no bit-flip type faults were obtained and
two sensitive areas per cell were missing.
Although they didn’t have any knowledge of the RAM
layout, this result is coherent with their previous hypothesis
of a counterbalancing effect due to the access transistors.
Standard SRAM cells used in microcontroller RAM usually
have two access transistors, leading to a masking effect in
one additional sensitive area (remember that the 5T SRAM has
only one access transistor).
IV. RESULTS FOR 30 PS PULSE DURATION
A. Laser Test Bench
The laser source we used has the following characteristics:
1030 nm wavelength, a laser pulse duration of 30 ps and an
energy ranging from 0 to 100 nJ. The optical path outputs a
Fig. 8: Laser-sensitivity map of a portion of the memory of a
microcontroller using 50 ns pulses [10].
spot of 1µm, 5µm or 20µm depending on the chosen lens.
An infra-red camera was used to adjust the focus of the spot.
Fault injection was performed through the front-side of the
chip. The optical lens is attached to a motorized XYZ stage
with a minimum step of 0.1µm.
B. Laser-Sensitivity Map Drawing Process
Using a PC to automate the process, we moved the laser
over the area of the cell by steps of 0.2µm. For each position
we shot the laser after writing the cell to 0, then shot again
after writing it to 1 and read the stored value after each shot.
This allowed us to draw a map of the results where for each
X/Y position of the laser spot on the cell where a fault has
been recorded, we draw a colored dot depending on the fault
type (red for a bit-set and blue for a bit-reset). Lastly, if we
can obtain a bit-set and a bit-reset on the same position it
means that bit-flips are possible on this specific position.
Such laser-sensitivity maps were drawn at various laser
energies.
C. Experimental Results
We carried out our laser-induced fault injection experiments
on the 5T SRAM cell already described (see figure 4) using
similar settings. However, we used a 30 ps laser pulse duration.
Our intent was to test whether the bit-set/reset fault model and
the absence of some laser-sensitive areas were still valid or not.
Figure 9 displays the laser-fault sensitivity map we obtained
at 3.2 nJ laser energy (higher energies led to the destruction
of the cell). Four laser-sensitive areas were obtained, which
is consistent with the laser-sensitivity assumptions depicted
in figure 5a. The previously hidden laser-sensitive area of
transistor MP2 is no longer missing. Moreover, similarly with
the results of Roscian et al., no bit-flip faults were induced.
We drew the assumption that the use of a 30 ps laser pulse
reduces the effect area of a laser spot as compared with a
nanosecond range laser pulse. As a result, a picosecond range
laser shot may not permit the existence of the counterbalancing
effect at the origin of the masking of laser-sensitive areas. We
studied further this assumption on the basis of simulations and
experiments as reported in the next subsections.
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Fig. 9: Laser-fault sensitivity map of a 5T SRAM at 30 ps.
D. Adaptation of the Simulation Model to Picosecond Pulses
Douin et al. [16] reported the most complete research work
in modeling at electrical level the effect of pulse duration on
laser fault injection into a SRAM cell. They introduced two
different electrical models: one for short laser pulses and the
other for long laser pulses (the threshold between short and
long pulses was around one nanosecond). We chose another
approach: using the electrical model already introduced by
Sarafianos et al. [9], [11], [12] for laser pulses in the nanosec-
ond range. However, we changed several parameters of their
model in order to take into account the laser pulse duration
and our assumption of a reduced effect area for shorter laser
pulses.
For the sake of brevity we refer the reader to the correspond-
ing bibliography [9], [11], [12] for a complete description of
this electrical model. It is mostly built to take into account
the laser-induced photocurrents. To that end, PN-junction pho-
tocurrents are modeled with voltage controlled current sources,
which are added to the electrical model of the target. The laser-
induced photocurrent model they built is given in Eq. 1:
Iph(t) = [a(E).Vr + b(E)].A.↵topology.⌦shape(t) (1)
The laser-induced current pulse is shaped in the time domain
thanks to the term ⌦shape(t) in Eq. 1 which takes into
account the laser shot duration. At 30 ps laser pulse duration,
⌦shape(t) has the shape of a double exponent lasting 100 ps.
The other three multiplicative terms model the photocurrent
pulse magnitude according to the other parameters of interest:
• a(E).Vr + b(E): where Vr is the junction’s reverse
voltage, and a(E), b(E) are coefficients depending on
the laser energy E. This term models the impact of both
the laser energy and the reverse bias voltage of the PN-
junction,
• A: the junction’s area,
• ↵topology: this coefficient models the influence of the
topology, i.e. the fact that the photocurrent magnitude
decreases as the laser spot distance from the PN-junction
increases.
As mentioned, the term ↵topology is used to model the effect
area of a laser shot, i.e. the effect of the distance between
the laser spot and a given PN-junction on the magnitude of
the corresponding laser-induced photocurrent. Sarafianos et al.
obtained its value experimentally for laser pulse durations in
the nanosecond range. It is depicted in deep blue in figure 10
for a 50 ns laser pulse duration: the effect of the laser extents
over several micrometers.
Fig. 10: ↵topology curves for 50 ns (deep blue) and 30 ps (light
blue) laser pulses.
Following our assumption of a reduced effect area at 30 ps
laser pulse duration, we adjusted ↵topology to a narrower shape
as depicted in light blue in figure 10 (the photocurrent magni-
tude is halved as the laser spot is moved of a distance of 0.5µm
away from the PN-junction of interest). The resulting laser-
sensitivity map is given in figure 11: it has four distinct laser-
sensitive areas (similarly to the experimental map displayed in
figure 9). The laser-sensitive area corresponding to the drain
of transistor MP2 is no longer missing. In addition, because
bit-set and bit-reset areas do not overlap in figure 11, it is a
further validation that the bit-set/reset fault model is valid for
picosecond range laser pulse duration.
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
Bit-Set
Bit-Reset
x(µm)
y(
µm
)
Fig. 11: Simulation-based SRAM cell laser-sensitivity map for
30 ps laser pulse duration.
Note that the experimental sensitivity maps were drawn
from frontside laser injection, as a result the shielding effect of
the SRAM’s metal interconnections is discernable in the shape
of the sensitive areas. This phenomenon is not taken into ac-
count at simulation level, this partly explains the discrepancies
between experimental and simulation-based sensitivity maps.
E. Analysis at Electrical Level
Figure 12a from [9] displays the internal nodes voltages
and currents of the SRAM cell in state "1" for a 50 ns laser
pulse targeting the drain of MP2. The photocurrent induced
in the drain of MP2 (Iph DMP2) that should be the root
cause of a SEU is too weak to lead to a flip of the SRAM
cell: the photocurrent simultaneously induced in the common
drain of transistors MN2 and MN3 (Iph DMN2_MN3) has
a decisive counterbalancing effect. For a 30 ps laser pulse
the counterbalancing photocurrent (Iph DMN2_MN3 in figure
12b) is almost equal to zero because the effect area of the laser
spot targeting MP2 is reduced. The photocurrent induced in
the drain of MP2 (Iph DMP2) goes rapidly above the current
flowing through transistor MN2 (IDS MN2): a SEU is induced.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 12: Extracted waveforms from the electrical simulator at
the drain of MP2 for (a) 50 ns [9] and (b) 30 ps pulse duration.
F. Application to a Commercial Microcontroller
We also performed laser fault injection in the RAM memory
of the same microcontroller used by Roscian et al. [10]. We
used the laser bench previously described, but contrary to the
test performed on a single cell, the injection was performed
through the backside of the chip. We drew a 40µm by 40µm
laser-sensitivity map of a part of its memory plane.
Figure 13 displays the obtained laser-sensitivity map (a
black rectangle delimits the surface of a single cell). 4 laser-
sensitive areas per cell are clearly observable, which is coher-
ent with our previous results. This map also seems to confirm
the hypothesis of Roscian et al. that the two access transistors
of 6T SRAM cells were masking two sensitive areas per cell
when using a 50 ns pulse duration.
Moreover, no occurrence of any bit-flip type fault was
observed. While some bit-set and bit-reset areas on the map
appeared to overlap, these cases are actually a bit-set occurring
on one cell and a bit-reset occurring on an adjacent cell for
the same laser spot position.
Note that a recent work from Courbon et al. [17] conducted
on a CMOS 90 nm D flip-flop also confirms the relevance of
the bit-set/reset fault model over the bit-flip fault model.
40µm
40
µm
Fig. 13: Cartography of a portion of the memory of a micro-
controller using 30 ps and 3.2nJ pulses.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that pulse duration has to be
carefully considered when performing laser fault injection tests
on SRAM cells. Be it during simulations at design time, or post-
production during tests on actual chips, limiting the study to
nanosecond range pulse durations may hide vulnerabilities.
The experimental results showed that the masking effect
which was leading to the disappearance of a sensitive area
in [10] does not occur with shorter pulses. This has for
notable consequence that the robustness improvement relying
on this masking effect presented in [18] may not be valid for
picosecond range pulses.
Our results are consistent with those of [10]: the bit-set/reset
fault model is relevant to describe laser-fault injection in
SRAMs.
We then improved the simulation model presented in [9],
[11], [12] by adapting it to picosecond range pulse durations.
The new model fits correctly with our experimental results.
Such a picosecond range model has also the interest to be
usable to emulate the effect of ionizing particles on ICs. This
extends the scope of this work.
Finally, these results were confirmed by running laser-fault
injection campaigns on the RAM memory of a commercial
microcontroller.
In future works we will aim to apply and extend these works
to more complex structures such as full standard cells with the
end goal of integrating the simulation process in the standard
design workflow.
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